Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Notion of Quality in the Right to Education Act, 2009

The first of its kind Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, which was finally realized 62 years following India’s independence in August 2009, is intertwined with a long history of debates about the provision of education to all children in this country. Sadgopal (2008) in his documentation of the history of these debates, notes that the debate goes as far back as 1882, when Mahatma Jotirao Phule’s memorandum presented to the Indian Education Commission (the Hunter Commission) talked about how the British government’s funding of education ‘tended to benefit the Brahmins and higher classes’, leaving the ‘masses wallowing in ignorance and poverty.’ The next important event was when Gopal Krishna Gokhale moved the Free and Compulsory education Bill in the Imperial Legislative Assembly in 1911. This met with much resistance, on the argument that resources were not enough and also on the concern that if all children were to attend schools, there would be nobody to work on the farms of the landlords! The argument of lack of resources was repeated in 1937, during the National Education Conference at Wardha, where Mahatma Gandhi talked about giving priority to Basic Education (Nai Talim). Debates again featured quite prominently in the constituent Assembly (1948-49), when the idea of ‘Universal Free and Compulsory Education’ was discussed. It was only after much effort that Article 45 went through, promising free education for children up to 14 years. However, since it was under the directive principles of state policy (Part IV of the constitution and not Part III, where it would have acquired the status of a Fundamental Right in Independent India) the article was deprived of the status of a fundamental right. It was not until 1993 (the famous Unnikrishnan Judgment) that the Supreme Court, in a radical interpretation of the constitution, conferred on Article 45 the status of a right, by linking it with Article 21, the Right to Life, which the court stated would be meaningless if it did not come with Right to Knowledge. This led to the introduction of Article 21 A.

To cut a story short, eight years later (in November 2001) the 86th Amendment Bill was presented to the Lok Sabha, but with serious flaws (such as the exclusion of the under six age group, among other equally important concerns such as inadequate budgetary allocations etc) as expressed by many civil society groups. The bill was passed by parliament in December 2002, without these concerns being addressed. It later became the ‘model bill’ or the Draft Right to Education Bill sent to the UTs and states. In 2009, this bill has now become the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, still with its many concerns intact.

What does the Education Act document have to tell us about educational quality? It must first be noted that the Education Act is a legal document, which means that education is justiciable, and as such, a court of law can be approached to address/resolve any grievance or complaint. In a legal document, we cannot expect detailed discussions or reflections of a conceptual nature, as we can in the case of academic documents like the NCF or even articulations made under large scale programs like the DPEP and SSA. Yet, nothing in the Act prevents anybody from referring to or using these other articulations of the government as a source of direction. The point however is: which articulation is to be used? How are these articulations to be interpreted? We have already seen the difference between articulations presented in the DPEP/SSA documents compared with another important government document, the NCF 2005, which propounds a different notion of quality. What is the relation between these documents and the Act? This would need examination. Should the Act have referred to these earlier documents for the purpose of interpretation? The Act does refer, in Chapter III, point 6(a): ‘The Central Government shall develop a framework of national curriculum with the help of academic authority specified under section 29.’ National Curriculum Frameworks can change from time to time, and are as such not immutable. This would allow for the predominant version of quality that has been negotiated at any given point in time.

As a legal document, the Act outlines certain conditions that have to be met by those involved in the provisioning of education – these could involve the government, parents, teachers, private school managements etc. If the conditions as stipulated in the Act are not followed, they are bound to invite punitive action in many cases. For instance, if the Headmaster of a school does not issue a transfer certificate to an out going student (Chapter II, under point 5.3), he/she is liable for disciplinary action under the service rules applicable. Another example is that of school provisioning (Chapter III, under point 6). Within three years from the commencement of the Act, the government should provide a school with the limits of the neighborhood if a school is already not available. Another assertion of a non-negotiable condition is the following (Chapter IV, point 14.2): ‘No child shall be denied admission in a school for lack of age proof.’ This is one way of ensuring access to a school. Many more such examples can be given. The point to be made is that by specifying certain conditions, the document hopes to put in place certain ‘minimums’ or ‘non-negotiables’ that are presumed to ensure quality. Are these minimums enough? Do they reflect what one would like to see as quality, the essential character of education about which we have been discussing? Further, are they clear and comprehensive? Let us take one example. Who is the teacher, if we are to implement the provisions in the Act effectively? Chapter IV (titled ‘Responsibilities of Schools and Teachers’), points 23.1 and 23.2 have to say something in this regard (P.8, Part II of the Act).

“23.1 Any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an academic authority, authorized by the Central government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher.

23.2 Where a state does not have adequate institutions offering courses or training in teacher education, or teachers possessing minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section 1 are not available in sufficient numbers, the Central Government may, if it deems necessary, by notification, relax the minimum qualifications for appointment as a teacher, for such period, not exceeding five years, as may be specified in that notification.

Provided that a teacher who, at the commencement of this Act, does not possess minimum qualifications as laid down under sub section 1, shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a period of five years.”

These points are vague, at best, and open to multiple interpretations. For instance, the Act is silent on the phenomenon of ‘para teachers’, which is argued by many as a dilution in the idea of a teacher, and as a cheap and economically effective way of filling teacher vacancies in many states, and as a logic that will be used to ultimately phase out all the regular government teachers with contract teachers (Kumar, 2001). What position does the Act take on this issue? Further, what about teacher preparation, another area which has been put into grave danger with the unregulated and unbridled expansion of private teacher preparation institutions all over the country in the last 8-10 years? Any person can possess ‘minimum qualifications’, but where these qualifications have been obtained from an institution whose quality is highly suspect, we have a serious problem. Thus, on the whole, the ambiguity regarding the teacher, a key determinant of quality is one among several such, in connection with the notion of educational quality that the Act seems to propound.

Should the Act even specify any conception of quality? This question needs to be discussed. As mentioned, by specifying certain ‘overall boundary conditions’, the Act hopes to ensure certain non-negotiable aspects of providing all children with a free and compulsory. In Chapter V (P.9, titled ‘Curriculum and Completion of Elementary Education), the Act specifies certain parameters which can be seen as intimately related to the idea of quality. It would be worth reproducing them here in full:

29 (1) The curriculum and he evaluation procedure for elementary education shall be laid down by an academic authority to be specified by the appropriate government, by notification.

29 (2) The academic authority, while laying down the curriculum and the evaluation procedure under sub-section (1), shall take into considerations the following, namely:

(a) conformity with the values enshrined in the constitution
(b) all round development of the child
(c) building up child’s knowledge, potentiality and talent
(d) development of physical and mental abilities to the fullest
(e) learning through activities, discovery and exploration in a child friendly and child-centered manner
(f) medium of instruction shall, as far as practicable, be in the child’s mother tongue
(g) making the child free of fear, trauma and anxiety and helping the child to express views freely
(h) comprehensive and continuous evaluation of child’s understanding of knowledge and his or her ability to apply the same

For a law to be enforceable or justiciable, it has to be precise, with no two meanings, since ultimately it has to be interpreted unambiguously by the judiciary. With the abovementioned points, there is much scope for subjectivity. For instance, how are we to understand points (b) and (d) above? In the context of schooling, developing mental abilities can involve a range of aspects Similarly, for point (e), where Child Centered again gives scope for much debate, and point (g), where ‘helping the child to express views freely’ finds mention. It can be claimed that a school is not child centered, or is not allowing children to express themselves freely. In the arguments that will follow, the school can defend itself on certain parameters, while the litigant can offer another set of reasons to suppose that the school is not child centered. How is the judiciary to make a judgment, when there is no precise definition of these terms? Further, in point (g), the inclusion of terms ‘fear, trauma and anxiety’ can similarly give rise to different interpretations, but it is argued by some that the judiciary is well versed with the ‘negatives’ – there is a history of litigation involving the negatives, and it therefore should be relatively easier to deal with them with some clarity. It is the positives which need to be sorted out. It can also be argued that if there had been precise definitions of ‘child friendly, child centered’ etc, these definitions could limit or ‘lock’ or ‘seal’ the notion of child-centeredness in education, which is essentially an open ended idea or notion that can be subjected to continuous reflection and debate. Indeed, in a larger sense, it can be argued that the notion of education cannot be laid out in a definite sense, for the very nature of the concept and the contemporary demands on it suggest that it be kept open for scrutiny.
Given the complexities that could arise in litigation involving the above aspects, one argument is that this loose description should not have been there in the first place as it can lead to much ambiguity. However, the question that will arise then is what notion of quality informs the Act. The only way out is for the judiciary to do its own systematic research and understanding of core concepts in education, which will enable it to provide an informed and fair judgment to resolve disputes. Where the disputes concern issues like infrastructure and basic facilities (as outlined in ‘The Schedule’ titled ‘Norms and Standards for a School, P.12 of the Act), they need not be complex. It is in the intangibles that a far more nuanced and refined understanding will be needed. Our initial reading of the Act has shown therefore that there is much to be discussed regarding the issue of educational quality.